I. Hegemonic and Hyper-masculinities in Conflict Settings
Masculinities theories and feminist analysis have not always worked in tandem, and only relatively recently have feminist scholars sought to address what masculinity studies has to offer feminist theorizing (Dowd 2010) . Using the gender lens drawn from various strands of feminist theorizing (Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011), we start by asking the "man" question, interrogating where and how men are situated in relation to the creation, perpetration, and institutionalization of violence (Dowd 2010) . In particular, how are men situated in relation to systematic and structural forms of violence aimed at the destruction of groups, communities, infrastructure, and social functioning? In what ways does hegemonic masculinity work, and how do masculinities operate to benefit even those men who are at the margins of masculinity norms and practice? Are there particular aspects of hegemonic and hyper-masculinity that operate in armed conflicts (and their aftermath) that can be differentiated from the forms that appear in comparatively peaceful societies?
We start with the notion of hegemonic masculinity that defines a dominant conception of masculinity as "a man in power, a man with power and a man of power" (Kimmel 2009, 61) . Understanding hegemonic masculinity is critical to seeing how the manifestation of manhood in multiple societal settings reinforces the power that some men maintain over women and other men. Hegemonic masculinity affirms such characteristics as "heteronormativity, aggression, activity, sports-obsession, competitiveness, stoicism, and not being female or feminine" (Cohen 2009, 144) . Hegemonic masculinity is "as much about [men's] relation to other men as it is about relation to women" (Dowd 2008, 233) . Somewhat ironically, even within the hierarchies of masculinity, subordinated masculinities can benefit from the social construction of male privilege and values. That hegemonic masculinities are embedded in multiple sites of social interface underscores their pervasive influence upon social interaction between groups of men, within familial and communal settings for men, and between men and women.
Much of the theoretical work exploring masculinities has been undertaken in western liberal societies. Many of the assumptions built into theorizing men and male experiences are grounded in empirical and anecdotal experiences of men living in western democracies, who have at least theoretical access to a range of social and other opportunities and where there is hypothetically greater capacity for social mobility. Important to our comparative application, Western societies are generally not perceived as having abnormal or excessive levels of violence, at least not as measured by conflict violence scales. Accordingly, in societies with fewer opportunities for men and in which access to social and economic capital is highly variable across social and cultural groups, the crossover and application of masculinities theorizing requires some adjustment. In societies where social choice and mobility is far more restricted and cultural assumptions about gender roles and expectations are far more deeply entrenched and immovable, conceptions of manhood may be more rigid and cultural differences as to familial role and communal roles may need to be integrated more fully into the analysis.
A.
Conflict and Hyper-masculinity While some generalizations are accurate concerning the role of masculinities in violent conflicts, the societal context matters. In studying these contexts, masculinity cannot be essentialized based on a view that all men are violent and all women are victims (Abrams 2010; Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). We must also guard against the possibility that apparent challenges to masculinities practices can " [entrench] hegemonic masculinity in other ways by perpetuating gender stereotypes positioning all men as prone to violence and all women as vulnerable to victimization and displacing the men and women that operate outside these binary constructs" (Abrams 2010, 703).
Of particular interest to our analysis is the lens of hyper-masculinity, "a masculinity in which the strictures against femininity and homosexuality are especially intense and in which physical strength and aggressiveness are paramount" (Harris 2000, 793 to 'go out with the prettiest young women,' and to 'dress well,' privileges they insist would not have been possible if they weren't carrying a gun" (2007, 76) . The prevalence of this kind of masculinity poses complex issues for undoing violence, for mainstreaming gender equality, and for remaking societies that have been fractured and deeply divided.
Post-conflict societies present a unique and under-analyzed site of examination for masculinities. One of the main reasons for this lack of attention is the presumption that the post-conflict context is equated to peace and that the absence of war makes moot any analysis of masculinity, which is presumed to have been "tamed" by the end of violent contestation with the following: first, economic and social insecurity; second, a lack of legal and political status particularly associated with group or ethnic identity; and third, the lack of opportunity for meaningful self-determination (whether external or internal) within the state. In multiple contexts, engaging in violence is a rational choice for men when few other opportunities may be provided to gain economic security (albeit that participation in violence provides a highly tenuous economic existence or longevity), social status and value within their communities, and security (again albeit tenuous and fragile) for their families and communities.
The existence of such deeply rooted links between the constructions of the masculine self and the social acceptance of "manhood" means that uncoupling the political contexts which bring about the formal end to hostilities from broader social and cultural contexts that produce certain kinds of masculine behaviors and values is complex. The end of violence is not a superficial engagement, but may require deep and difficult entanglement with the masculine construction of self in many societies. In post-conflict societies, where there is no functioning governance or economic structure, such conundrums are compounded by the lack of other opportunities available to men to assert positive masculinities. Such positive masculinities include caretaking and support roles, roles that evidence nurturing capacity, and engaging in a broad range of social and economic activities that in highly gender stratified societies would be gendered female.
B. Masculinities and the Ending of Conflicts
This question of violence and its ending is central to the post-conflict experience because the cessation of public violence between (generally) male combatants is usually the litmus test for evaluating the success of the transition from war to peace. We take issue with the presumption that the end of public violence and the measurement of security based on the safety of male combatants should constitute an adequate calculation of peace in any society.
Instead, achieving peace requires accounting for, and directly addressing, the causes of violence, a process that requires engaging inter alia with hyper-masculinity. Of course, issues of causality are extremely complex, dependent on variations in social and cultural contexts.
Nonetheless, post-conflict literature has begun to explore the strong overlap between the causes of violence and the emergence of certain forms of masculinity in conflicted societies.
If we fail to address the causalities discussed above within a framework that integrates gender and masculinities, we may also fail to address the ongoing realities of how masculinities closely interconnect with post-conflict social, political, and economic outcomes.
In addition to recognizing the forms and patterns of masculinities emerging in conflict and post-conflict situations we must also acknowledge the specific masculinities associated with international intervention and the cadre of male elites who come into conflict endings exercising multiple roles and functions. Beyond a more nuanced recognition of these international masculinities, we also want to address the complex set of role assumptions for The transmission of intergenerational expectations compounds the entrenchment of stratified gender roles, and can nullify any attempts to advance gender equality and the loosening of gendered expectations around caring and parenting for women. The core point is that conflicted societies can mummify highly gendered role expectations for men and for women from early childhood in ways that are quantifiably more intense than in societies not experiencing communal violence. Additionally, in societies experiencing ethnic or religiously driven hostilities, the overlay of "othering" that accompanies the construction of the social and masculine self is profoundly linked to the reproduction of violence through the generations and the valuing and self-identification of the man through violent action. In such contexts, when children engage in violent activities, consent is a highly fraught measurement given the longitudinal socialization to violent norms that may be endemic to upbringing in particular communities. Joining an armed group provides adolescents with the potential for adventure (ibid.).
Children may also join to take revenge against other armed groups who have killed family members. Additionally, both boys and girls may join to escape from oppressive home environments, although girls are far more likely than boys to claim that domestic violence or feelings of exploitation were their primary motivation for joining. Once children become associated with armed forces, they undergo efforts to entrench and endorse violence, competitiveness, and destructive capacities; this may become a "proving ground for masculinity" viewed as a "rite of passage, transforming boys into men" (Carreiras 2006, 41) .
Through participation in conflicts, boys may feel that they have become men, and they may find male role models (Barker and Ricardo 2005).
Child militarization also occurs through coercion, including conscription, abduction, and forced involvement in violent activities, the latter directly aimed at the families and communities they have been taken from. Here, the intended consequences are breaking down familial and social bonds, and destroying the community by the horrific manipulation of its most vulnerable. Post-conflict settings require addressing gender in multiple ways, including through close attention to masculinities as part of the high-priority (and funded) measures to end violence. Programs specifically focused on disarming and reintegrating former combatants need to account for masculinities in their mandates and program deliveries. They need to do so in a thoughtful way that integrates scholarly and interdisciplinary insights squarely into the policy arena.
Masculinities discourses and theory have begun to transform scholarly and practical understandings of the methods and means of warfare, as well as to tease out the causalities of war and the means to bring about an end to public communal violence between male combatants. In the context of post-conflict, peacemaking, and transitional discourses, however, attention to masculinities has been much less evident. Our contribution seeks to remedy that gap by bringing the theory and practice of masculinities discourses to bear on these fields, focusing on the particular vulnerability of child soldiers and the victimization of men during conflict. This Chapter has sought to rebut the general presumptions that masculinities disappear at the formal ending of hostilities and during the peacemaking phase of conflict. Rather, masculinities are ever present and deeply problematic to ensuring successful outcomes with a sustainable peace. In particular, we suggest that hypermasculinity maintains its presence in post-conflict societies-and is particularly manifest in the experiences of violence in the private sphere for women and the increases in criminality and "ordinary" violence in transitional societies.
Notwithstanding the cultural, legal, and social variations between countries facing postconflict issues, the core issues around the centrality of gender remain universal. In undertaking this analysis, we are convinced that addressing gender and the differing needs of men and women is not only good policy and practice on its own merits, but that it also meets the first principle of conflicted and post-conflict societies-namely, ensuring that violence ends for all, is not reignited, and that peace is sustainable far into the future. i It is important, then, to acknowledge the men who have recently come forward in the Congo to attest to having been raped by both rebels and Congolese soldiers alike. The American Bar Association, running a sexual violence legal clinic in Goma, states that more than 10 percent of its rape cases in June of 2010 were men who were then cast out by their villages and families, shamed and referred to as "bush wives," the pejorative term used for years to describe women forcibly taken as sex slaves or "wives" of these same soldiers (Gettleman, 2009 ). The experiences of these men were later discounted.
ii In the documentary film Gender against Men in which one individual gives evidence about the experience of being raped 20 years earlier, the testimony itself is highly unusual. In the field where the testimony was taken, the speaker was shouted down in a communal setting, as if the community as a whole did not want to "hear" what had been done.
iii Article 77(2) states that: "The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest." 
